

Message Text

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TAGS:PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT:MBFR: PAPER ON PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF OPTION III

REFS: A. STATE 214686 DTG 100043Z SEP 75

-----B. BONN 14428 DTG 041655Z SEP 75

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-----C. NATO 4841 DTG 051750Z SEP 75

1. IN REFTEL A WE STATED THAT WE WOULD PROVIDE AN ALTERNA-
TIVE TO THE FRG PAPER (REFTEL B). THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES

THAT ALTERNATIVE TEXT. WE STILL HAVE PARAS 10-18 OF FRG
PAPER UNDER REVIEW AND WILL SEND OUR COMMENTS ON THEM SHORTLY

2. BEGIN TEXT OF US DRAFT OF "PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF
OPTION III" PAPER:

A. THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, TO KEEP
DISCUSSION OF OPTION III CONFIDENTIAL. STATEMENTS TO THE
PRESS REGARDING THE DETAILS OF OPTION III, OR REGARDING THE
DETAILS OF DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST, WOULD VIOLATE UNDER-
STANDINGS WITH THE EAST REGARDING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WOULD ALSO BE CONTRARY TO ALLIED INTERES
IN THAT THEY WOULD PROBABLY PROVOKE PUBLIC COUNTER-REACTIONS
FROM THE EAST, RESULTING IN A POSSIBLE HARDENING OF POSITION
A DELAY IN THE CONSIDERED EASTERN RESPONSE WHICH THE ALLIES
SEEK, AND A DIMINUTION OF THE CHANCES THAT SUCH A RESPONSE
WOULD BE POSITIVE.

B. NEVERTHELESS, SERIOUS PRESS LEAKS REGARDING THE CONTENT
OF CURRENT INTERNAL ALLIED DISCUSSION OF OPTION III HAVE
ALREADY OCCURRED AND MAY CONTINUE. FROM WHAT HAS BEEN
PUBLISHED IN THE WESTERN PRESS, INTERESTED OBSERVERS ARE
ALREADY IN A POSITION TO PIECE TOGETHER A REASONABLY ACCUR-
ATE PICTURE OF THE FORTHCOMING ALLIED PROPOSAL. ONCE THE
ALLIED PROPOSAL IS PUT FORWARD IN VIENNA, PRESS INTEREST
WILL INCREASE, AND IT WILL BECOME EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO
MAINTAIN COMPLETE CONFIDENTIALITY.

C. IN THIS SITUATION, ALLIED OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR
DEALING WITH THE PRESS MAY BE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN A "NO
COMMENT" POSTURE. SERIOUS QUESTIONS MAY BE RAISED IN THE
PRESS AND IN THE MIND OF THE PUBLIC OVER THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR ALLIED SECURITY OF THE OPTION III PROPOSAL. IT WILL
BE NECESSARY TO DEAL IN A POSITIVE WAY WITH THESE CONCERNS.
HOWEVER, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, ANY RESPONSE SHOULD BE LOW-
KEY IN NATURE, CALCULATED TO AVOID EXTENSIVE PUBLIC
COMMENT OR DEBATE.

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D. SPECIFICALLY, ALLIED SPOKESMEN MAY NEED TO DEAL WITH
POSSIBLE CONCERNS:

--THAT THE ALLIES ARE DEPARTING FROM THEIR BASIC APPROACH
OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND INCREASING ALLIED SECURITY
THROUGH REDUCING OR ELIMINATING THE MANPOWER/TANK DISPARI-
TIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN FAVOR OF SOME OTHER CONCEPT.

--THAT THE ALLIES HAVE ACCEPTED THE EASTERN POSITION THAT
ALL TYPES OF FORCES SHOULD BE PROPORTIONATELY REDUCED.

--THAT ALLIED SECURITY MAY BE SIGNIFICANTLY DIMINISHED
THROUGH US NUCLEAR WITHDRAWALS, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT

OF THE FACT THAT THE ALLIES ARE NOT REQUIRING CORRESPONDING EASTERN REDUCTIONS IN SUCH FORCE ELEMENTS.

--THAT THE ALLIED STRATEGY OF DETERRING WAR THROUGH MAINTAINING FLEXIBLE RESPONSE CAPABILITY MAY BE WEAKENED OR UNDERMINED.

--THAT THE US COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE MAY BE REDUCED AND THE "LINK" TO THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT WEAKENED.

E. THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF PRESS INTEREST IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE VIENNA, AS IT HAS BEEN HERETOFORE. WORKING WITHIN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF COUNCIL GUIDANCE ON THIS MATTER, THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP, AS NEEDED, APPROPRIATE GUIDANCE FOR ITS SPOKESMEN. ALLIED SPOKESMEN IN BRUSSELS AND IN CAPITALS WILL ALSO NEED TO BE IN A POSITION TO DEAL WITH PRESS INQUIRIES. NONETHELESS, WE DO NOT NOW DESIRE TO ENTER INTO A PUBLIC DEBATE WITH THE EAST ON MBFR PROPOSALS OR PRESENT A NATO WHITE PAPER ON THE ALLIED POSITION, PARTICULARLY OPTION III. THEREFORE, ALLIED PRESS SPOKESMEN SHOULD NOT BE AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ON THIS PRESS GUIDANCE UNTIL THE AD HOC GROUP HAS JUDGED THAT THERE IS A NEED TO DO SO, THE TIMING IS CORRECT AND DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS WILL NOT PREJUDICE A CONSIDERED EASTERN RESPONSE. FINALLY, WE DO WISH TO REASSURE WESTERN PUBLICS THAT OPTION III REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE
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WESTERN SECURITY IF, REPEAT, IF TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN REDUCTIONS THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED. HOWEVER, IN MAKING SUCH REASSURANCES, WESTERN PRESS SPOKESMEN SHOULD NOT DEPRECATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS.

F. ALLIED SPOKESMEN MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS AS APPROPRIATE: THE PRIMARY ALLIED OBJECTIVE AS THE OUTCOME OF MBFR CONTINUES TO BE THE REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS THROUGH THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND AGREEMENT IN PHASE I TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON THE GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES. THIS DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES IS THE MOST DESTABILIZING FEATURE OF THE MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE; ITS REDUCTION WOULD LESSEN THE RISK OF WAR, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WAR, IN EUROPE.

--THE ALLIES DO NOT ACCEPT THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT ALL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS MUST BE PROPORTIONATELY REDUCED. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD LEAVE INTACT THE CURRENT DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES THOUGH AT LOWER LEVELS, THEREBY DIMINISHING NATO SECURITY.

--AFTER EXTENSIVE REVIEW OF THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR, THE ALLIES HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE A MAJOR NEW INITIATIVE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT. THIS PROPOSAL INVOLVES THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS FROM CENTRAL EUROPE, INCLUDING SOME US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, SOME US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT, AND SOME US SURFACE-TO-SURFACE PERSHING MISSILE LAUNCHERS. IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED THAT THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING TO BE REACHED IN PHASE II BE EXTENDED TO COVER AIR AS WELL AS GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

--THIS INITIATIVE IS A ONE-TIME OFFER AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A STEP TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR OR AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT. TAKEN TOGETHER WITH PREVIOUS

ALLIED PROPOSALS, IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT EASTERN CONCERNS THAT AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED.

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--IN VIEW OF THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF THESE US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, THE ALLIED OFFER IS A WEIGHTY ONE AND THESE REDUCTIONS TOGETHER WITH THE ELIMINATION OF THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY AND THE REDUCTION IN THE TANK DISPARITY SHOULD MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO IMPROVED STABILITY IN EUROPE. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT ITS SIGNIFICANCE WILL NOT BE OVERLOOKED BY THE EAST, IF THE EAST IS TRULY INTERESTED IN PURSUING PRACTICAL MEASURES OF DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD IN EUROPE AND IS INTERESTED IN REACHING A SUBSTANTIAL AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY AND REDUCE THE RISKS OF WAR IN EUROPE.

--THE NEW ALLIED PROPOSALS ARE REALISTIC AND SOUND, IN TERMS OF THEIR EFFECTS ON ALLIANCE SECURITY. IT IS THE JUDGMENT OF ALL CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF EASTERN AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND AGREEMENT TO A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER AS THE OUTCOME OF MBFR, THE PROPOSED ALLIED REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT DIMINISH NATO SECURITY. AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE MAKES POSSIBLE A REDUCTION OF SOME US NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. BUT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT US TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DETERRENT AGAINST A SOVIET ATTACK, THE WEST MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE AREA.

--IF THE PROPOSED REDUCTIONS OF US GROUND FORCES AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS TAKE PLACE, NATO WOULD RETAIN FULLY ADEQUATE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER WAR IN EUROPE THROUGH THE AGREED NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THIS STRATEGY WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE BASIS OF ALLIED DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE.

--THE US COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF ITS ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE REMAINS FIRM AND UNCHANGED. THE US WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN IN EUROPE LARGE AND HIGHLY CAPABLE FORCES, BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR. THIS LARGE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCE DEMONSTRATES US RESOLVE TO PARTICIPATE WITH THE ALLIES IN THE DEFENSE OF THE NATO AREA. MOREOVER, THIS COMMITMENT IS BACKED BY LARGE CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAT CAN REINFORCE EUROPE AND ULTIMATELY BY THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT.

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--THE ALLIES EXPECT THE EAST TO MAKE A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THIS IMPORTANT INITIATIVE AND TO AGREE TO ADDRESS ALLIED CONCERNS ABOUT THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE
END TEXT. KISSINGER

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